

IV. THE ARTESANAL AND MANUFACTURING SECTOR

6. THE COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY OF COCHABAMBA, 1770 - 1810: THE OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITS OF GROWTH

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Though it would be trite to describe eighteenth century Cochabamba as a region of paradoxes, there is perhaps no other way to account for the contradictions and discrepancies of so many European reports on the region. Reliable and astute colonial observers like the Intendants Francisco de Viedma, Francisco Paula Sanz and the Czech naturalist Tadeo Haenke at times seemed to view local society through stereopticons that rarely brought the two images into sharp focus.¹ After touring the valleys, European observers would often admire the "opulent haciendas of maize and wheat" and "excellent pastures that nourish multitudes of sheep," while lamenting the region's cash-hungry hacendados. Viedma, for example, described in detail Cochabamba's craft industries and bustling peasant markets. Yet he characterized the peasants and urban plebe as chronically idle and slothful. And while he invariably noted the strong acculturative forces at work in the largest "mestizo province" of Alto Peru, he warned against the "indigenization" of colonial customs and language, as Quechua increasingly "contaminated" the speech of the creoles. And, finally, the very statistics on trade and prices that Viedma compiled in the 1780's and 1790's seemed to contradict his own generalizations about the region's alleged over-abundance of wheat and maize in most agricultural years as well as his assumption that Cochabamba exported little grain or cotton cloth to the markets of the Altiplano.²

To be sure, eighteenth century Cochabamba did not "fit" the dominant Andean mold - if indeed there was one. It was neither an Indian region, like the neighboring province of Chayanta where hacendados never displaced nor marginalized Indian village society; nor was it an intensive monocultural zone like the nearby coca-producing province of

Chulumani.³ Since the sixteenth century the cereal haciendas had become the dominant agrarian structure, originally producing for the silver mines of Potosí and, to a lesser extent, Oruro. By the eighteenth century the regional economy had experienced something of an economic involution, as landowners' commercial profits were pinched by the long-term contraction in demand for their foodcrops at the highland mines and as the hacendados faced growing competition from peasant smallholders. The proliferation of small-scale wheat, maize and potato cultivators who (crop yields permitting or scarcity dictating) regularly participated in the product and labor markets were, of course, internally differentiated. And a narrow layer of peasant producers managed to prosper and accumulate; but their meager gains rarely spelled peasant proprietorship and freedom from rent.

In fact, material conditions probably deteriorated for most valley peasants over the course of the eighteenth century, as colonial authorities imposed new burdens and liens on the peasant household. To wit, the rural population of Cochabamba supported one of the largest (in absolute terms) legal yearly *repartos* (or forced distribution of merchandise) between 1754 and 1780.⁴ And after the Bourbons systematized tribute collection in the late 1770's, they levied tax (at six pesos, two reales – one of the stiffest rates in Alto Peru) on the *forasteros* of the province.⁵ In addition, rapidly growing population in the valley of Cliza and other parts of the region placed more pressure on productive resources and swelled the ranks of the impoverished and rootless. These "structural factors" placed a downward pressure on many peasant households and cut into the thin margin of social insurance most families relied upon in their struggle against the endemic uncertainties of agrarian life, where normally grain harvests could double and halve from one year to the next.

I. Agrarian Origins of Industry

How did peasants on valley haciendas shape their economic lives to guarantee themselves a stable livelihood from one year to the next? Despite all the liens that the state, the church and individual landlords placed on the surplus product of peasant labor, peasants who inhabited hacienda lands in the central valleys were commercially oriented whenever nature afforded them an abundant or good harvest. The smallholders of Cochabamba were notorious for their commercial activities and networks of *ferias* which provided the mechanism for the distribution

of food crops, seeds, and manufactured goods throughout most of the region.⁶ But while small-scale peasant marketing certainly undermined landlord monopoly, farming alone usually offered little chance for most households to radically improve their standard of living. This was especially so as population pressure increased in the late eighteenth century in the central valley and agricultural prices throughout Alto Peru tended to stagnate during the latter part of the eighteenth century, according to a preliminary study of commodity prices over the course of this century.⁷ Out of the countervailing forces of population pressure and local commercial opportunity, many peasants began to diversify their economic activities and turn to petty crafts and trade. Capital-poor and land-short, country people channelled their labor ("the idle hands" for which local authorities had such contempt) into industry.⁸ Alongside *producción parcelaria* in the central valleys arose multifarious cottage industries: *chicha* making (in Cliza and the Cercado), lumber and carpentry (in Sacaba), soap, glass-blowing and gunpowder workshops (in Cliza) and, most importantly, cotton textiles (in Quillacollo and the Cercado).⁹

Cochabamba's primitive cotton textile industry developed late, during the second half of the eighteenth century. Unlike the production of woollens which predominated in the western provinces of the Altiplano, cotton manufacturing in the valleys was a dispersed, cottage industry that sprang up in the towns of Cochabamba, Tarata, and Quillacollo and the surrounding countryside.¹⁰ It did not entirely displace textile manufacturing in *obrajes*, where rural laborers were engaged as spinners and weavers under deplorable conditions, at the command of their landlord or employer who owned the looms and other instruments of production. On many haciendas peasants were forced to spin and weave, as well as to cultivate their lord's lands. In the 1780's, the male tenants of the hacienda Caporaya in the Calliri river valley, for example, had to sentence their wives to the workshops of the hacienda where they turned wool and cotton into yarn and wove cloth, all as part of their labor rent.¹¹

But on most haciendas, including Caporaya, peasants wove *bayetas* and other rustic woollen cloth, under orders of their landlord, mainly for home consumption. Cochabamba had few commercial *obrajes* in the late eighteenth century, and as a result, the region imported from distant provinces most of its rustic woollen cloth.

A sample of one fifth of the colonial goods that entered the province in various years between 1777 and 1808, which were taxed and regis-

tered in the royal *alcabala* accounts, reveals that rustic cloth destined for peasant consumption was the principal item of import.¹² Various types of *bayeta* generated almost 30 percent of the tax value of the total number (1,313) of goods sampled. Rustic clothing imports added another 12 percent of the tax value, so that cheap woolen cloth and clothing for peasant consumers represented almost half of the value of all taxable merchandise that entered the province. *Obrajes* and workshops in the highland provinces of La Paz and north of Lake Titicaca, especially around Cuzco, supplied the Cochabamba valleys with most of its woolen imports.¹³ Thus, while the cost of cotton textile production was generally higher than spinning and weaving woolen cloth, especially where there was no local supply of raw cotton, the competition from the small workshops (*chorillos*) and *obrajes* of the highlands compelled the artisans of Cochabamba to turn to *tocuyo* production.¹⁴

Tocuyo was the cloth of the laboring poor. It was a rustic, undyed cotton textile that Indians and mestizos used.¹⁵ The Intendant of the city of Arequipa, another center of *tocuyo* manufacture, explained in his *Memorias* "that the *plebe* wears *tocuyo* cloth as undergarments."¹⁶ *Tocuyos* were considerably cheaper than the dyed cotton cloth of Quito, and after 1780 local rustic cotton cloth edged the famous quiteño textiles out of the market.¹⁷ But the crude and plain cloth never spontaneously replaced the finer cottons and woolen textiles imported from Europe. The prosperous consumers in the valleys continued to purchase European cloth in abundance, "draining the province of scarce money," Intendant Francisco de Viedma complained in 1788.¹⁸ Cochabamba's *tocuyeros* sent some of their product to distant markets, but stiff competition from European textile manufacturers restricted their markets to the local ones. Local producers were even more hard put to overcome the logistics of transit time, weight, bulk and profitability entailed in long-distance, overland trade once Spain opened Spanish ports in 1778, including the great port of Barcelona, for direct trade with Buenos Aires. The Crown's "free trade" policy and state subsidies for Spanish textile manufacturing stimulated the rapid growth of cotton cloth production in the metropolis. In only a decade (1775 to 1784), the production of cotton textiles in Spain increased threefold, and Barcelona became a major cloth supplier to the Viceroyalty of La Plata.¹⁹ Furthermore, the *tocuyeros* of Cochabamba confronted British contraband traders who introduced cheap, mass-produced cotton textiles from the factories of Manchester and the rustic calicoes from India.²⁰ The relatively late development of the textile industry in Cochabamba, its primitive nature, the crude quality of the

cloth, and the difficulty of procuring raw cotton from distant sources of supply created formidable obstacles which (without drastic disruption of international trade) neither enterprising artisans nor shrewd merchants in Cochabamba could hope to overcome.²¹ Under "normal" circumstances, then, the textile industry of Cochabamba was oriented toward the consumption of the laboring classes, both urban and rural, and subject to the constraints of a narrow market.

Contemporary sources defy precise estimate of the number of people who were engaged in cloth production and marketing in Cochabamba. In 1788 Viedma mentioned that 500 *cholos* and *mestizos* occupied themselves in cloth manufacturing in the parish of Quillacollo.²² But a plethora of small workshops also peppered the parishes of the Cercado and Tarata. Many years later, in 1804, Juan Carillo de Albornoz made reference to some 3,000 *tocuyo* weavers in the province.²³ The number of women and children engaged in spinning, dyeing and marketing *tocuyos* probably trebled that estimate, so that perhaps eight or ten thousand people were involved in one or another stage of production or distribution during peak output. This may well be a conservative estimate. In his 1827 report on potential market and investment opportunities in Bolivia, the British envoy John Barclay Pentland estimated that as many as 20,000 people in the province fashioned raw cotton into *tocuyos* during the 1790's.²⁴ In any event, we can say with reasonable certainty that Cochabamba far surpassed the province of Arequipa, its closest competitor, in the volume of *tocuyo* production in this period. The Intendant Barriga reported in the late 1780's that in the town environs of Arequipa weavers produced at least 124,000 *varas* of cloth each year.²⁵ This output hardly compared to the 300,000 *varas* of cloth that merchants in Cochabamba dispatched to distant marketplaces in the same period.²⁶ And that estimate apparently excludes the bulk of the cloth destined for local consumption. Cochabamba was probably the largest producer of *tocuyos* in the Andes. Tadeo Haenke, the Czech naturalist who resided in Cochabamba for many years, apparently thought as much: "...the Province of Cochabamba ... consumes [as much cotton] in its looms as all the other [provinces] combined."²⁷

For all the growth and promise of the textile industry in Cochabamba, curiously little information was left to us about the industrial organization of *tocuyo* production. Haenke often referred to the primitive conditions under which people worked. "As I mentioned earlier," he wrote in 1799, "one finds industry in these towns in its first infancy ... The utensils, instruments, and some of the looms are poorly constructed

and lack the use of those [English] machines that facilitate and abbreviate the different tasks".²⁸ The power looms and other machinery that would have speeded up and standardized cloth production in Cochabamba was, of course, turning the cities of Manchester and Belfast into textile workshops of the world and launching England's Industrial Revolution.

But in these Andean pockets of commercial textile production, non-capitalist social relations predominated. The labor process was divided essentially into three phases: the preparatory work of cleaning and plying and spinning cotton; weaving cloth on the treadle looms; and stretching and dyeing the finished cloth. In many cases this last process was eliminated, and unbleached, undyed *tocuyos* were sold and used. A rudimentary division of labor existed, as workers engaged in one or another of the stages of production. Women and children performed what Haenke called the "auxiliary tasks" of cleaning, spinning the wool, and stretching and dyeing the finished cloth. These tasks were more time consuming, and female spinners generally outnumbered male weavers by more than three to one.²⁹

At first, spinning and weaving was subsidiary to their work on the land. Peasants sometimes turned to artisanal activities when farmwork slackened. But I suspect that as opportunities for commercial gain increased, particularly in the 1790's, a population of professional weavers sprang up in the towns and loosely associated themselves in craft guilds.³⁰ As the demand for yarn increased, women also allocated less time to agricultural chores. This was particularly so because short-fibered cotton was more cumbersome than wool to manipulate. It required more labor and concentration to align the fibers and turn cotton into yarn than to spin wool. Unlike Andean women of the highlands who spun wool as they watched over their herds, the cotton spinners of Cochabamba could not easily combine spinning and shepherding. Demand for cotton yarn must have drawn peasant women off the land into their huts and to the river banks where they cleaned the cotton or stretched the fabric to be dyed with imported indigo.³¹ Thus, while rural people initially turned to handicrafts to supplement and complement agricultural activities, as one of the few economic strategies available to peasants unwilling to emigrate to eastern plantations or other parts, the prospects or possibility of earning their subsistence entirely from craft production impelled some people to devote themselves entirely to their trade. At a certain point, certainly in the year 1799 when Haenke wrote his report on the province's industry, "inferior classes of people [were] able to earn the better part of their subsistence from this industry."³²

For the moment, at least, some peasants had managed to diversify their household economy in ways that presaged the diverse, complementary commercial, industrial, and agricultural activities of the valley smallholders of Cochabamba in the mid-twentieth century.³³

The expansion of textile production was not exclusively the consequence of spontaneous peasant economic diversification into artisan activities, however. Large numbers of smallholders shifted their productive efforts towards industry probably because merchants provided incentives (or exported pressures) for them to do so. Particularly in the 1790's, when political and economic circumstances changed radically as we shall see shortly, merchants and enterprising landlords probably deployed credit devices to stimulate textile production and increase their control over the distribution of woven cloth. Yet the material records leave few traces of a fullscale putting-out system in operation, except for an occasional notarial entry showing a merchant seeking repayment from a *tocuyo* spinner who had accumulated a debt to the claimant.³⁴

The relatively minor role that Cochabamba's merchants played in the organization of textile production contrasts sharply with the dominance of merchant capital in cotton textiles in the Puebla region of Mexico during the late colonial period. As G.P.C. Thomson discusses in his article in this volume, merchant capital virtually controlled the cotton cloth industry in Puebla throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Though "...merchants' interest in the [Mexican] industry fluctuated, ... even in the worst periods of recession ... merchant capital can be found fomenting cotton agriculture, financing the transportation and distribution of raw cotton, financing weavers' production, and marketing their products."³⁵ Puebla's textile industry was older, more capitalized and vertically integrated, and more highly specialized than the *tocuyo* industry in the southern Andes in the same period. Indeed, Puebla's merchants and artisans in the early eighteenth century already had staked out a corner of the textile market in that colony by orienting production around a specialized, high-quality garment, the *rebozo*, which benefitted from silk weaving techniques known to local artisans, who learned to apply them to cotton weaving. Puebla's looms produced a product that was marketable far beyond the boundaries of the regional economy. Set against the entrenched, specialized industry of Puebla, textile manufacturing in Cochabamba appeared to be a precarious industry still fairly atomized among an artisanry which had strong ties to the land. Merchant capital never exercised the same degree of control over *tocuyo* production in Cochabamba that it had achieved in

the Puebla industry by the early eighteenth century. Even when commercial conditions changed for the better in the late 1790's, Cochabamba's merchants failed to capture control of the industry or alter its structure of production in any enduring way.

II. War and the Textile Bonanza

Although Viedma was a Physiocrat at heart, he never doubted the importance of developing Cochabamba's industry. One of his pet charity projects, in fact, was the resurrection of a wool textile factory in the old, abandoned *obraje* of Hulincate located in the Sacaba valley. It was to be state-run and financed (through a provincial tax on *chicha* consumption) and designed to employ poor and marginally productive members of society. Like the Indians of the jungle ex-mission villages, these industrial workers were to learn the "arts" of spinning and weaving.³⁶ Yet, however laudatory his proposal for this *obra pía* and his plan to provide employment for the humble classes, Viedma was unwilling to challenge Spain's restrictions on industrial growth in the colonies, even as the tide of Spanish trade in textiles to the Viceroyalty of La Plata grew heavier in the 1780's.³⁷ After 1778, European textiles and the calicoes of the East Indies stiffened the competition that itinerant peddlars of inferior *tocuyo* cloth inevitably faced in distant marketplaces. It was not until war temporarily halted that transatlantic trade flow that Viedma and a few local investors seriously considered local industry as a solution to the chronic problems of idleness, under-employment, and capital shortage.

Cochabamba experienced an extraordinary manufacturing bonanza between 1796 and 1802, when trade between Europe and the southern Atlantic ports collapsed as a result of war and the breakdown of Spanish military control of the La Plata river basin. In 1796, after Britain declared war on Spain, the superior British navy moved into the mouth of La Plata and sealed off the port of Buenos Aires from the outside world. Sudden economic isolation in the midst of Spain's imperial crisis afforded a tremendous stimulus to the Viceroyalty's fledgling industries.³⁸ Across the pampas, in Chile and Alto Perú, urban consumers of all social classes now turned inward to local sources of supply for their cotton, woolen and linen textiles.³⁹ Those regions like Cochabamba, Córdoba, Tucumán, and Arequipa which already possessed a local industrial base, however primitive in organization, had a new lease on their economic lives.⁴⁰ The event of war and its side effects provided

more incentive, theoretically at least, for peasant households to diversify their economic activities, local merchants to invest more capital in long-distance trade in cloth, and established artisans to put more spinning wheels and treadle looms into use. But whether strong and sudden market incentive had a more profound and lasting effect, either upon the internal reorganization of textile production into capitalist or semi-capitalist enterprises or upon the regional class structure, is an entirely separate question that merits comparative research on specific regional economies. The textile bonanza of Cochabamba is a case study of rapid industrial growth in the absence of any real transformation in social productive relations.

After 1796, Cochabamba became one of the main suppliers of rustic cotton textiles to cities throughout the Viceroyalty of La Plata. In his 1788 report, Viedma had estimated that cloth worth 60,000 pesos left Cochabamba for "outside provinces" (excluding the eastern districts of Mizque, etc., which absorbed about 15,000 pesos worth of *tocuyo*). In 1798, Pedro Canals, the provincial treasurer, stated that registered *tocuyo* exports for the year 1797 had been valued at 88,085 pesos (at the unit price of two reales per *vara*, the same unit price Viedma recorded in 1793).⁴¹ This represented a 47 percent increase over the 1793 estimates. The treasurer further estimated that in the first three months of 1798, *tocuyo* exports were worth 46,156 pesos. This was more than three times the *tocuyo* exported in a three-month period in 1793. Increasingly, *tocuyo* was in demand in distant markets. In 1799, the registry of the Alcaldia of Buenos Aires listed merchants importing large amounts of *tocuyo* from Cochabamba.⁴²

The increasing demand for *tocuyo* beyond the boundaries of the province was reflected in the gradual increase in its local price. In the 1780's it rarely sold for more than one and a half real; in 1793 its price was two reales. By 1799, a *vara* of *tocuyo* usually sold for two and a half reales. In Buenos Aires in 1798, the price was sometimes as high as three and a half reales.⁴³ Under the stimulus of external demand more looms were employed in cotton textile production. The opening of the markets at Potosí and Buenos Aires for *tocuyo* cloth during a period when less silver was drained out of the Viceroyalty by Spanish and British merchants seemed to offer the solution to Cochabamba's economic anemia. England's belligerency had ostensibly created favorable trade conditions which would channel currency to the province and trigger an economic boom for spinners, weavers and merchants in Cochabamba. It soon became clear, however, that the windfall profits many

had hoped would enrich them overnight were not to be realized unless new supplies of raw cotton were found.

The overnight boom in *tocuyo* production made the region increasingly dependent on the raw cotton produced in the Peruvian coastal area around Moquegua and in the vicinity of Arequipa. Viedma estimated that in 1788 Cochabamba imported about 11,000 *arrobos* of cotton at two pesos, four reales per *arroba*.⁴⁴ In 1798 he reported that the province annually consumed about 30,000 *arrobos* of cotton. The best quality cotton came from the coast and cost as much as six pesos in 1798.⁴⁵

Cochabamba's dependence on imported cotton concerned Viedma and other officials and merchants who saw that much of the income from *tocuyo* only left the province in the pockets of cotton traders. In 1798, Viedma reported that 180,000 pesos flowed out of the region to Arequipa and the coast.⁴⁶ It was the cotton planters of coastal Peru who seemed to be reaping the greatest profits from the *tocuyo* boom. Viedma petitioned the Viceroy and king for permission to cultivate cotton in Santa Cruz.

Perhaps the greatest exponent of local cotton production was the naturalist, Tadeo Haenke. His famous 1799 essay (published in the *Telégrafo Mercantil* of Buenos Aires in 1801) explained the benefits of growing cotton in Cochabamba's semitropical frontiers. He urged the Crown to allow the province to break its economic dependence on coastal Peru by becoming self-sufficient in cotton. He estimated that the province alone consumed 30 to 40,000 *arrobos* of cotton each year, not to mention the cotton needed for *tocuyos* the region exported. Haenke made a strong case.

[This cotton] is the fuel for the *tocuyo* trade which not only brings considerable benefits to this city; it also provides employment for the inferior class of people who earn the better part of their living from this industry... The *tocuyos* of Cochabamba are so inferior and backward that they are comparable to cotton cloth from Asia. During the present war, *tocuyos* have been the only resource of these interior provinces. With the end of communication with Europe and the complete lack of [Spanish, English and Asian] textiles, many individuals would have found themselves naked had it not been for Cochabamba's *tocuyos*. In consideration of all the circumstances of these colonies and of the moral character of their inhabitants, it is not only useful, but necessary, to foment the cultivation of cotton in every way possible and to develop the cotton textile industry which presently is in its infancy.⁴⁷

Haenke went on to enumerate the reasons why the Crown should permit the large-scale production of cotton and *tocuyo* in Cochabamba. His main argument was that Spain's own textile industry would not be harmed by his proposal. High transport costs and royal taxes on the export of raw cotton to Spain and more taxes on imported Spanish textiles made the cloth a relatively high priced item of consumption; its market in Cochabamba was consequently restricted to the upper class. Haenke argued that other European nations, namely England, realized the benefits accruing to the metropolitan country of having abundant supplies of raw cotton produced in its overseas colonies, in North America and India. The cotton produced in India was woven into cheap calicoes, some of which was exported by the Philippine Company to the Spanish colonies. Furthermore, Haenke argued, the textile factories in Spain could not meet the needs of all the Spanish colonies, whose population was rising steadily. Only the growth of manufactories in the colonies would begin to meet the needs of the poor for cheap cloth.⁴⁸

The naturalist offered one further argument for royal sponsorship of local cotton cultivation and *tocuyo* manufacturing. He expounded on the need to develop a manufacturing sector to absorb the growing population of landless mestizos and cholos in Cochabamba. Outside of agriculture, he said, there was no industry to absorb the growing population of underemployed peasants and laboring poor and the large floating mass of vagrants. The growth of a rustic textile industry, Haenke argued, would absorb a vast number of the region's poor. Like the neo-mercantilists of his day, Haenke believed that a healthy economy depended on the employment of its population in industry or specialized agriculture. He appealed to the Crown to consider the benefits accruing to the state with the citizens of "these kingdoms" industrious and usefully employed.⁴⁹ This was to be the great panacea for the indolence and economic stagnation which Viedma had publicly deplored in his 1788 report.

The great campaign for local cotton cultivation and development of the *tocuyo* industry – a campaign that probably peaked in 1801 with the publication of Haenke's essay – seemed to have burned itself out by 1804. The British lifted their blockade in 1802. By 1804 and 1805 royal income from *alcabalas* levied on imported European goods increased sharply.⁵⁰

This probably indicated the entry into the province of large quantities of Spanish goods, particularly textiles. Whether they were actually sold in those years cannot be determined. But this is indirect evidence of the contraction of Cochabamba's export trade in *tocuyos*.

As the new decade opened, the inspired and optimistic economic proposals of Viedma and Haenke probably seemed futile to most observer. A new sense of realism seemed to pervade. The few proposals for economic reform written after 1802 were far less innovative than the earlier schemes. One of the longest reports was written in 1804 by creole merchant and administrator (a *regidor* of the local Cabildo), Juan Carrillo de Albornoz.⁵¹ He wrote of the European competition which had silenced many of the region's 3,000 looms. But Carrillo de Albornoz did not even consider the issue of establishing cotton plantations in the eastern lowlands. His proposal centered around the need to impose tighter regulations on the quality of *tocuyo* woven in Cochabamba. It was as if the vision of Cochabamba's progressive administrators had dimmed after the repeated opposition they had encountered not only from the Crown, but from the Audiencia of La Plata as well. With the end of the blockade, the industry seemed doomed. Carrillo de Albornoz's proposal to improve and standardize the quality of *tocuyo* cloth by regulating the size and number of combs in the looms was less the aim of an enlightened administrator than the medieval remedy offered by a myopic merchant who hated to see his profits from *tocuyo* exports dwindle in the face of European competition.⁵² Stricter regulation over the local guild of *tocuyo* weavers was a conservative measure that threatened neither the Crown, nor the Audiencia of La Plata nor the entrenched planter class on the Peruvian coast. On the other hand, his proposal to restrict cloth production to those weavers who met municipal regulations presumably would improve the quality of the finished cloth and raise *tocuyo* prices.

The proposal of Carrillo de Albornoz reflected his class biases. For the wholesale merchant, like Carrillo de Albornoz, who wanted a commodity that continued to be marketable in Potosí and Buenos Aires after the blockade was lifted, a price rise of several reales would probably make little difference. But for the weaver and petty trader who depended on the mass consumption of local Indians and mestizos for their returns, tighter guild regulations and standardized production could spell ruin. When the plan came before the Consulado of Buenos Aires in 1806, the ministers came down on the side of the merchants by approving measures to restrict and control *tocuyo* production.⁵³ Yet, despite these new measures, most administrators and merchants realized that the *tocuyo* industry and merchants would wither and turn inward once again to supply the local plebe.⁵⁴ The new age of prosperity, an age that Viedma and Haenke hoped would rival early colonial times when

Cochabamba nourished the silver mining towns with grains, was not to be realized.

Conclusions

Who were the beneficiaries of this brief expansion in *tocuyo* exports? Was there any perceptible shift in wealth distribution as a result of the boom? According to rough contemporary estimates, about 1,000 weavers joined the ranks of the *tocuyo* producers during the boom. There was more employment or semi-employment in this industry because of the flourishing export trade. If there were approximately 3,000 weavers in Cochabamba by 1800 and most were mestizos or cholos, as Haenke reported, then about seven percent of the total mixed blood population (as estimated by Viedma in 1788) was engaged in *tocuyo* weaving alone.⁵⁵ Most profits, however, were generated in the distributive rather than productive process, in the long-distance, wholesale trade in *tocuyo*. It is difficult to calculate the average rate of return from the wholesale export of *tocuyo* to Potosí or Buenos Aires. But it was undoubtedly less than 50 percent. During the campaign to get royal consent to cultivate cotton in the Intendancy of Cochabamba, local officials argued that the lower cost of locally grown cotton would allow merchants to realize a net profit of 50 percent on the sale of *tocuyo* in Buenos Aires (at the current market price of three and one-half reales per *vara*). Officials arrived at this estimate simply because the market price in Buenos Aires was about 75 percent higher than in the local market.⁵⁶

The profits from this trade accrued mostly to a small group of merchants who monopolized control over the carriage trade. The serious shortage of pack animals in the Cochabamba province since the 1780's threw long-distance trade into the hands of wealthy merchants and landowners who owned mule trains or commissioned muleteers to bulk and carry the cloth to those markets. In 1801, several sub-delegates registered complaints with the Consulado about the monopolistic cloth merchants. Even when they agreed to carry cargoes for other traders and artisans, they charged freight prices far in excess of the stipulated rates and they demanded cash advances.⁵⁷ This situation virtually excluded all but a few wholesalers from participating directly in the long-distance *tocuyo* trade. Few artisans, if any, were in a position to experience bootstrap mobility or to turn their workshops into small factories employing wage workers.

If the profits of the *tocuyo* boom accrued to but a handful of local merchants and thus further concentrated wealth within the elite, who precisely were these merchants? Notarial books and wills show that the sons of large landowners who held property themselves made large investments in *tocuyo* exports to Buenos Aires and other cities. Cochabamba's largest *tocuyo* wholesalers were not only large landowners; their prestige and power also rested on high positions in the local militia or political office. Francisco García Claros, for example, was a large *tocuyo* exporter and held the position of Royal Receptor of Alcabalas; Juan José Eras y Gandarillas, a large merchant who inherited rich maize land (*maicas*) on the outskirts of Cochabamba and who owned haciendas in Quillacollo in 1808; Francisco Ventura Valiente, probably the largest *tocuyo* merchant, was a lieutenant in the militia; and Juan Carrillo de Albornoz, a large *tocuyo* exporter and the advocate of guild regulations, was a perpetual member of the Cabildo. Those who reaped the profits from the trade were clearly not merchants moving up the social ladder. They were well-established, respected members of landed society who exercised power in the province. These merchants occupied the upper stratum of provincial society which managed to hold on to its landed properties. They composed part of the landed elite which speculated in tithes, bonded one another, and married endogamously. It was this small group of merchants in the last years of the colonial period who were the only substantial money lenders aside from the monasteries. What little wealth they accumulated from the textile bonanza was probably sunk into usurious ventures, land, and tithes. Few merchants were willing to invest mercantile capital in cash-crop agriculture in the eastern lowlands, as Viedma had hoped they would. Nor were the merchants interested in revolutionizing the textile industry. The windfall profits from *tocuyo* exports seemed only to tie them more tightly into the local rentier economy.

Thus, the great *tocuyo* export boom of 1796-1802 did not signal the beginning of a transition towards capitalist enterprises in the region. Merchants did not plough their new-found wealth into the productive process, altering either the forces or relations of production. Despite their financial capacity and the new political climate in which Haenke wrote his famous tract on the benefits of industry, the moneyed middlemen remained locked in their old ways, unwilling to diversify their investments or restructure the textile industry. This is certainly not surprising, given the opportunities and constraints they faced, particularly the fluctuation in market demand for *tocuyos* in distant cities. Indeed, they

seemed only too aware of the evanescence of the lucrative, long-distance trade in *tocuyos*. Beneficiaries of an artificial situation, that undermined the very principles upon which the colonial regime rested and that would end the moment the British interlopers were expelled, the merchants had little incentive to establish the kind of factories that Haenke prescribed. Furthermore, the progressive, pro-industry forces in the region ran up against resolute opposition from the Viceroy and the Audiencia to their efforts to promote cotton plantations in the semi-tropical lowlands of Mizque and Santa Cruz. Raw material costs and the difficulties of procuring cotton from coastal traders on a steady basis placed a dead weight on industrial expansion, apart from the shifting winds of the market.

If the textile bonanza marked the *failed* transition to nascent capitalist development in this Andean region, it must have left an indelible imprint on the political consciousness of many people in the region. Artisans and merchants alike witnessed the spectacular commercial opportunities afforded by the naval blockade. For one ephemeral moment the provincial elite saw some of the barriers to regional economic growth begin to crumble. The "chronic idleness" of Cochabamba's sub-altern classes seemed to evaporate before their eyes, as peasants and urban artisans turned their energy into spinning and weaving as never before. And for the first time, a few members of the elite capitalized on the rustic cottons. The ideological implications of their collective experience could not have been lost on even the most staunch royalists. It is surely no coincidence, moreover, that following Independence the merchants and artisans of Cochabamba collectively were the young nation's strongest advocates of protectionism against the onslaught of British traders.

NOTES

1. See Francisco de Viedma, *Descripción geográfica y estadística de la provincia de Santa Cruz de la Sierra* (Cochabamba, 1969); Francisco Paula Sanz, *Descripción de la provincia de Cochabamba*, 21. September 1783, RAH, Colección Mata Linares, 9/1725; Tadeo Haenke, "Memoria sobre el cultivo de algodón, y el fomento de sus fábricas en esta América" (1799), *Telégrafo Mercantil*, II:36 (1801), ff.289-295.
2. Viedma, *Descripción geográfica*, pp.77 and passim; Paula Sanz, *Descripción de la provincia*, ff.2-3.
3. See Tristan Platt's study of Chayanta, *El estado boliviano y el ayllu andino: Tierra y tributo en el Norte de Potosí* (Lima, 1982) and Herbert Klein's

- "Hacienda and Free Community in Eighteenth Century Alto Peru: A Demographic Study of the Aymara Population of the Districts of Chulumani and Pacajes in 1786," *JLAS*, 7:2(1975), 193 - 220.
4. After 1754 the corregidor of Cochabamba was authorized to distribute throughout the region merchandise worth a total of 186,675 pesos. This legal *repartimiento* constituted about 3 percent of the total value of legal *repartos* in Peru. In absolute terms, only the provinces of Sicasica and Tarma absorbed more legal *repartos*. For an overview of the regional distribution of *repartos* see Jürgen Golte, *Repartos y rebeliones: Túpac Amaru y las contradicciones del sistema colonial* (Lima, 1980), pp.96 - 97. See also A. Moreno Cebrian, *El corregidor de indios y la economía peruana en el siglo XVIII* (Madrid, 1977).
 5. The Crown assessed most *forasteros* of the Altiplano provinces 5 pesos, or less. On the other hand, *forasteros* who inhabited the fertile valleys of the province of La Plata paid higher rates than even the *forasteros* of Cochabamba. AGN(P), IX, Justicia, 31, 3, 4, Legajo 7; AGN(P), III, Padrones, 17, 6, 1, 17, 10, 2 and 18, 2, 1. See also Nicolas Sánchez Albornoz, *Indios y tributos en el Alto Peru* (Lima, 1978).
 6. See my article "Rural Rhythms of Class Conflict in Eighteenth Century Cochabamba," *HAHR*, 60:3(1980), 407 - 430.
 7. Enrique Tandeter and Nathan Wachtel, *Precios y producción agraria. Potosí y Charcas en el siglo XVIII* (Buenos Aires, n.d. [1983]).
 8. For a discussion of similar processes of household diversification in parts of Europe during the early modern period, see B.H. Slicher Van Bath, *The Agrarian History of Western Europe, A.D. 500 - 1850* (London, 1963), p.217.
 9. See Viedma, *Descripción geográfica*, especially pp.66 - 67, 75 - 77, and 166 - 168. An interesting description of a local gunpowder factory came to the attention of the Consulado of Buenos Aires, when it ordered gunpowder to be sent to the militias of Buenos Aires to protect that port city from the English. The primitive factory in Cochabamba produced only inferior powder used in mine blasting. AGN(P), Interior, IX, 5, 9, 1, no. 2075, 1808.
 10. Viedma, *Descripción geográfica*, p.47.
 11. Expediente por el Yndígena Esteban Pablo contra su padron Manuel Almarás de la hacienda Caporaya, 1795, AHMC, Legajo 1273.
 12. The sample consisted of one entry out of every five listed in the royal *Libros de Alcabalas* for the following two-years periods: 1777 - 1778, 1782 - 83, 1787 - 88, 1792 - 93, 1797 - 98, 1802 - 03, and 1807 - 08. During those years the accounts were kept in good order, and taxes were collected with reasonable regularity. For more discussion, see my dissertation "Economic Decline and Social Change in an Agrarian Hinterland: Cochabamba in the Late Colonial Period" (Ph.D. Diss., Columbia University, 1978), pp.234 - 240.
 13. The *alcabala* entries generally listed the region of origin, though sometimes only the last toll station was mentioned. On Cuzco's exports of textiles in the late eighteenth century, see Maximiliano Moscoso, "Apuntes para la historia de la industria textil en el Cuzco colonial," *RU*, vols. 51 - 52, nos. 122 - 125 (1962 - 1963), 67 - 94, and Magnus Mörner, "En torno a las haciendas en la región del Cuzco desde el siglo XVIII," in E. Florescano, ed., *Haciendas, latifundios y plantaciones en América Latina* (Mexico City, 1975), pp.355 - 357.

14. On the comparative costs of wool and cotton textile production, see Hans Pohl, "Algunas consideraciones sobre el desarrollo de la industria hispanoamericana - especialmente textil - durante el siglo XVII," *AEA*, 28(1971), p.13.
15. Memoria de don Juan Carrillo de Albornoz, 15 Abril 1804, AGN(P), IX, Interior, 30, 7, 5, Legajo 56, Exp. 6.
16. P. Victor M. Barriga, *Memorias para la historia de Arequipa*, Tomo I: 1786 - 1791 (Arequipa, 1941) p.53.
17. Viedma listed the price of quiteño cloth as 3 pesos per vara; *tocuyos* commanded 2 reales per vara in 1788. Viedma, *Descripción geográfica*, pp.147 and 137, respectively.
18. *Ibid.*, p.47.
19. James C. LaForce, Jr., *The Development of the Spanish Textile Industry, 1750 - 1800* (Berkeley, 1965), p.15.
20. Haenke, "Memoria sobre el cultivo de algodón," p.293.
21. See below, pp.160ff.
22. Viedma, *Descripción geográfica*, p.67.
23. Source cited in note 14.
24. John Barclay Pentland, Report on the Bolivian Republic (1827), Great Britain Foreign Office, 61/12, f.176.
25. Barriga, *Memorias*, p.53.
26. Viedma, *Descripción geográfica*, pp.137, 139, 140 - 141.
27. Haenke, "Memoria sobre el cultivo de algodón," f.291.
28. *Ibid.*, f.293.
29. *Ibid.*, and Pentland, Report, f.176.
30. See below, p.164.
31. I am grateful to Elaine Zorn for educating me about the intricacies of weaving and spinning techniques. For a retrospective description of women spinning and cleaning cotton along the banks of the Rocha River in the Calacala district outside the city of Cochabamba in the late colonial period, see Federico Blanco, *Diccionario geográfico de la República de Bolivia* (La Paz, 1901).
32. Haenke, "Memoria sobre el cultivo de algodón," f.291.
33. See Fernando Calderon and Jorge Dandler, "Diversificación, complementación, y proceso de trabajo de la economía familiar en el desarrollo regional de Cochabamba." (La Paz, 1980), Mimeographed.
34. Autos por el Regidor de Cane...contra Maria Vargas, 1804, AHMC, Legajo 1213.
35. G. Thomson, "The Cotton Textile Industry in Puebla During the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries," in this volume.
36. Viedma proposed the economic rejuvenation of ex-Jesuit missions in the tropical selva of Mojos and the lowland and plains of Chiquitos, east of the town of Santa Cruz. *Descripción geográfica*, pp.167 and 173 ff.
37. On the other hand, Viedma and other authorities argued that "popular industry" would not compete with Spanish metropolitan interests, but, on the contrary, would strengthen imperial interests by stimulating the economy of the colonies and employing masses of indolent people. *Descripción geográfica*, pp.166.
38. David Brading mentions the effects of British interference in the transatlantic trade on Mexico's cloth industry in the same period, in his "El mercantilismo ibérico y el crecimiento económico en la América Latina del siglo XVIII," in

- E. Florescano, ed., *Ensayos sobre el desarrollo económico de México y América Latina (1500-1975)* (Mexico City, 1979), p.312. A comparative analysis of the effects of the breakdown of international trade on local textile industries has still to be written.
39. On the impact of the blockade of Buenos Aires on the growth of the vice-royalty's industries see Pedro Santos Martínez, *Las industrias durante el Virreinato, 1776-1810* (Buenos Aires, 1969), chapter 2. See also José María Mariluz Urquijo, "Noticias sobre las industrias del Virreinato del Rio de La Plata en la época del Marqués de Aviles (1799-1810)," *RHAA*, 1-2 (1956-57), 85-118.
 40. See Carlos Sempat Assadourian, "El sector exportador de una economía regional del interior argentino. Córdoba, 1800-1860. Esquema cuantitativo y formas de producción," *NA*, 1(1978), 57-104, especially 79-88.
 41. Viedma, *Descripción geográfica*, pp.137, 139, 140-141. Canals to Consulado, 16 april 1798, AGI, Charcas, Leg. 436.
 42. This information was kindly provided me by Susan Socolow. *Tocuyo* imports from Cochabamba were supposed to be registered and taxed. Such records are found in the AGN(P), Alcaldía, 1799.
 43. Viedma, *Descripción geográfica*, p.137; Canals to Consulado, 16 April 1798, AGI, Charcas, Leg. 436, and Haenke, "Memoria sobre el cultivo de algodón," ff.289-295.
 44. Viedma, *Descripción geográfica*, p.145.
 45. Viedma to Consulado, 3 April 1798, AGI, Charcas, Leg. 436.
 46. *Ibid.*; in 1827 Pentland reported that in the golden age of *tocuyos* traders from the coast sold bales of cotton to Cochabamba merchants in the towns of Paria and Tapacarí. *Report on the Bolivian Republic*, f.180 v.
 47. Haenke, "Memoria sobre el cultivo de algodón," ff.291-293.
 48. *Ibid.*, ff.291-292.
 49. *Ibid.*, ff.293-294.
 50. AGN(P), XIII, Cajas reales, Cochabamba, 1777-1809. For a complete list of the *legajos* and yearly amount of taxes, see Appendix 14 of my unpublished dissertation, "Economic Decline and Agrarian Change," p.447.
 51. Report is cited in note 15.
 52. Carrillo de Albornoz, in fact was one of Cochabamba's wealthiest merchants.
 53. Santos Martínez, *Las industrias*, p.43.
 54. Indeed, by the early 1800's many local producers were most concerned about the British threat to flood the market with cheap cotton cloth from Manchester's factories and the calicoes from East India. On the short-term impact of British competition on Cochabamba's *tocuyo* industry, see Pentland, *Report on the Bolivian Republic*, f. 176 ff.
 55. Viedma's 1788 population estimates, according to his *Descripción geográfica*, were as follows:

Indians	56,890	(46%)
Mestizos	39,171	(31%)
Cholos	2,883	(2%)
Whites	20,089	(16%)
Blacks, Mulattoes	6,212	(5%)
	<hr style="width: 20%; margin: 5px auto;"/>	
	125,245	(100%)

56. It was argued that the price differential (3 1/2 reales in Buenos Aires, compared to 2 reales in the city of Cochabamba) would more than compensate for long-distance transport costs. Plan que propone don José Gómez Merino, (n.d. [early 1790's]), RAH, Colección Mata Linares, 9/1667, f.86.
57. Subdelegados to Consulado, 15 February 1801, AGN(P), IX, Consulado, 4, 6, 4, Tomo 14.